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LAW OF THE INTERMEDIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
Jacqueline D. Lipton
*
 
Abstract 
 
When Wikipedia, Google, and other online service providers staged a 
―blackout protest‖ against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in January 
2012, their actions inadvertently emphasized a fundamental truth that is often 
missed about the nature of cyberlaw. In attempts to address what is unique 
about the field, commentators have failed to appreciate that the field could—
and should—be reconceptualized as a law of the global intermediated 
information exchange. Such a conception would provide a set of organizing 
principles that are lacking in existing scholarship. Nothing happens online that 
does not involve one or more intermediaries—the service providers who 
facilitate all digital commerce and communication by providing the hardware 
and software through which all interactions take place. This Article advocates 
a fundamental shift in the nature of cyberspace scholarship towards a law of 
the ―intermediated information exchange,‖ and explains the benefits of such 
an approach in developing a more predictable and cohesive body of legal 
principles to govern cyberspace interactions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The January 2012 ―blackout protest‖ against the Stop Online Piracy 
Act (SOPA) mounted by Wikipedia, Google, and other online service 
providers
1
 brings into sharp relief what is unique about cyberlaw as a 
legal field. The current SOPA bill
2
 is the most recent example of the 
ongoing battle between market players and lawmakers attempting to 
delineate the boundaries of legal responsibility for wrongful online 
conduct. As a longtime casebook author and teacher of cyberlaw, I have 
struggled, along with many of my colleagues, to provide a cohesive 
theoretical framework for the study of the subject. In a typical law 
school course, professors usually start out with general questions related 
to the nature of cyberspace and the technology‘s impact on the 
development of legal regulation. Invariably this leads to a discussion of 
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook‘s infamous rejection of cyberlaw as 
nothing more than a cyber ―law of the horse‖ that fails to illuminate the 
entire law in a meaningful way because it has no unifying features.
3
 
What is easy to miss about cyberlaw—and what the battle over 
SOPA brings to the forefront of the debates—is that the field is, in 
reality, the law of the intermediated information exchange. All online 
interactions—social, commercial, academic, artistic—are exchanges of 
information facilitated by one or more third party intermediaries. These 
third parties include search engines, payment systems, Internet service 
providers (ISPs), gaming platforms, social network operators, domain 
name registrars, and web hosting services. Nothing can happen online 
that does not involve one or more of these actors. Moreover, it is the 
struggle to address these actors‘ legal role with respect to online wrongs 
that creates the law and policy challenges that are unique to cyberspace.  
The law of cyberspace is in reality the law of the intermediated 
information exchange transacted on a global stage. This realization 
suggests that the dual focal points of cyberspace law should be (1) the 
role and regulation of online intermediaries and (2) associated 
jurisdictional challenges. This Article sets out a new theoretical 
framework for cyberlaw that is more cohesive and principled than the 
                                                                                                                     
 1. For discussion of the protest, see, for example, Amy Goodman, The SOPA Blackout 
Protest Makes History, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 18, 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/co 
mmentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/18/sopa-blackout-protest-makes-history (last visited May 11, 2012). 
 2. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://thomas.loc. 
gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.3261:. 
 3.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207, 207–08 (1996). 
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current piecemeal approaches found in most casebooks.
4
  
Part I critiques existing approaches to cyberlaw and explains why 
current paradigms fail to serve the field‘s needs as it has developed over 
the last ten to fifteen years. This Article suggests that past scholarship 
has missed the mark in failing to focus on what is truly unique about 
cyberspace—its nature as a global intermediated communications 
medium. Part II suggests novel ways for reorganizing the field to focus 
on the role of online intermediaries in a global communications 
environment. Part III examines jurisdictional challenges that are unique 
to cyberspace and suggests ways in which they might be appropriately 
addressed within a reconceptualized cyberlaw field. This Article 
concludes by drawing together the issues raised in Parts II and III in 
order to formulate a new approach to the field with significantly more 
internal cohesion than past approaches. 
I.  CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF CYBERLAW  
Despite the resilience of cyberlaw as a staple in today‘s law school 
curricula, no one has yet accurately explained the nature of the field. It 
has been in the face of uncertainties surrounding its boundaries that 
casebook writers (myself included) began to organize the debate around 
the infamous ―law of the horse‖ categorization of cyberspace law 
offered by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook in 1996,
5
 and the response to 
Easterbrook penned soon after by eminent cyberspace scholar Professor 
Lawrence Lessig.
6
  
In remarks prepared following an invitation to comment on property 
law in cyberspace in the 1990s, Judge Easterbrook likened cyberspace 
law to a cyber ―law of the horse.‖7 He noted that courses involving the 
cross-sterilization of more than one field, such as law and technology, 
tended to offer the worst of both worlds.
8
 They were doomed to be 
taught by professors who knew little about either field.
9
 He further 
opined that the most effective way to learn laws as they apply to 
specialized endeavors is to study rules of general application.
10
 
Otherwise, any new field that emerged would lack unifying principles 
that might illuminate anything meaningful about the law more 
generally.
11
 
                                                                                                                     
 4. See discussion infra Part I. 
 5. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 207–08. 
 6. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 501, 501–03 (1999). 
 7. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 207–08. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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In his oft-cited response to Judge Easterbrook, Professor Lessig 
claimed that cyberlaw did, in fact, ―illuminate the entire law,‖ although 
not in the way Judge Easterbrook described.
12
 Professor Lessig 
acknowledged that—as a matter of substance—cyberlaw might be 
conceived as a series of disconnected tort, contract, and intellectual 
property problems.
13
 However, he noted that ―there is an important 
general point that comes from thinking in particular about how law and 
cyberspace connect.‖14 This general point was not about the substance 
of the law as it might be applied in cyberspace, but rather ―about the 
limits on law as a regulator.‖15 
Professor Lessig utilized this insight as a springboard for his well-
known work on the application of multiple regulatory modalities to 
cyberspace. These modalities include law, social norms, markets, and 
system architecture.
16
 Professor Lessig‘s work has emphasized the 
significance of system architecture, or software code, as the key 
regulatory modality for cyberspace. He has noted that online behavior 
can be more or less completely and almost perfectly regulated by 
software code to an extent that could never be paralleled by legal rules, 
which are often poorly understood and imperfectly enforced.
17
  
The tendency to focus cyberlaw scholarship on the Easterbrook–
Lessig debate in subsequent years has become problematic for two 
reasons. The first is that it effectively freezes the debate within 
conceptions of the Internet as it existed in the early to mid-1990s. 
Subsequent scholars have made little attempt to move the debate 
towards more modern conceptions of the Internet. In other words, the 
debate as framed today tends to lack the benefit of hindsight, the ability 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Lessig, supra note 6, at 502. 
 13. Id. (―Courses in law school, Easterbrook argued, ‗should be limited to subjects that 
could illuminate the entire law.‘ ‗[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to specialized 
endeavors,‘ he argued, ‗is to study general rules.‘ This ‗the law of cyberspace,‘ conceived of as 
torts in cyberspace, contracts in cyberspace, property in cyberspace, etc., was not.‖) (citations 
omitted). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. (emphasis added). 
 16. Id. at 507–08 (identifying these four modalities of regulation in both physical world 
and cyberspace contexts). 
 17. Id. at 514 (―I argued that whether cyberspace can be regulated is not a function of 
Nature. It depends, instead, upon its architecture, or its code. Its regulability, that is, is a 
function of its design.‖); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555–56 (1998) (―This 
Article argues, in essence, that the set of rules for information flows imposed by technology and 
communication networks form a ‗Lex Informatica‘ that policymakers must understand, 
consciously recognize, and encourage. . . . [P]olicymakers can and should look to Lex 
Informatica as a useful extra-legal instrument that may be used to achieve objectives that 
otherwise challenge conventional laws and attempts by governments to regulate across 
jurisdictional lines.‖). 
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to look at what the Internet has become and what unique legal issues 
have arisen in cyberspace since Judge Easterbrook and Professor Lessig 
presented their early comments.  
The second drawback of relying on the Easterbrook–Lessig debate 
as an organizing focus for the modern study of cyberlaw is that such an 
approach tends to polarize scholars into two camps: those who believe 
that cyberlaw is not really a field of law at all, and those who believe 
that cyberlaw is a field that involves the complex interplay of multiple 
regulatory modalities of which software code is perhaps the most 
significant.
18
 While aspects of each point of view are undoubtedly 
correct, scholars have tended to avoid developing alternate explanations 
for cyberspace law.
19
 
Paradoxically, in the meantime, other important areas of cyberlaw 
scholarship have evolved, including a body of literature about the extent 
to which spatial metaphors derived from the physical world could—or 
should—be meaningfully applied to cyberspace.20 Another ongoing 
debate has focused on the regulatory competence of domestic 
governments over the Internet.
21
 Important as these bodies of 
scholarship have unquestionably become, they do not answer the most 
foundational questions about the nature and contours of cyberlaw as a 
legal field.  
This Article argues that scholars can, and should, revisit the debate 
about the nature of cyberlaw with the benefit of hindsight which is the 
ability to examine pertinent legal developments and marketplace 
advances since the early Easterbrook–Lessig debates. Common unifying 
threads for the field have emerged if one is prepared to tease them out. 
They arise from the fact that the Internet is a global communications 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 19. There have been some exceptions to this general trend. See generally Raymond Ku, 
Foreword: A Brave New Cyberworld?, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 125 (2000); Ira Nathenson, Best 
Practices for the Law of the Horse: Teaching Cyberlaw and Illuminating Law Through Online 
Simulations, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 657 (2012). 
 20. See generally John P. Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Feb. 
8, 1996, https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011); Julie 
E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007) (reflecting on place- and 
space-based theories of cyberspace); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the 
Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003) (describing cyberspace as anticommons); 
Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003) (discussing application 
of real property law to cyberspace); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace: 
Property in Information and Information Systems, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 235 (2003) (describing 
application of real property and personal property metaphors to cyberspace). 
 21. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: 
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006) (arguing that national governments can and do 
regulate cyberspace effectively); DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON‘S MOOSE: NOTES ON 
THE STATE OF CYBERSPACE (2009) (arguing against domestic governments‘ regulating 
cyberspace). 
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forum above all else and that all Internet interaction must be facilitated 
by third party intermediaries. Thus, a conception of cyberlaw that 
focuses on its global nature and on the role of these intermediaries will 
provide the unified framework that Easterbrook felt was lacking in 
1996. 
Additionally, while Professor Lessig was undoubtedly correct in 
conceiving of cyberlaw as involving an interaction between various 
online regulatory modalities—including laws, social norms, market 
forces, and software code
22—there is still a need within the literature for 
a conception of cyberlaw that focuses on the legal aspect of this 
equation. In the real world, law always interacts with other modes of 
regulation. Our behavior in the tangible universe is constrained as much 
by physical fences and walls, as well as social mores, as it is by legal 
rules.
23
 This is no different in cyberspace, other than the fact that the 
precise content of the norms and the nature of the system constraints 
may vary online from those in the real world.  
It is imperative that scholars engage with Internet law as a specific 
endeavor outside the interaction of law with other modes of online 
regulation. Professor Lessig and others may be correct in suggesting 
that system architecture is a more effective regulator of online behavior 
than legal rules.
24
 But that is no reason not to develop the legal rules 
appropriately within the context of a more cohesive theoretical 
framework. In the real world, prison bars and guards with guns provide 
more effective constraints on the behavior of convicted criminals than 
sentencing laws. But that is no reason not to maintain a body of 
sentencing law.  
The aim of this Article is to renew and refocus debates on the nature 
of cyberlaw. The key features of the Internet for the purposes of this 
discussion are: (a) all online conduct involves information exchange as 
opposed to physical contact;
25
 (b) all online communications are 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Lessig, supra note 6, at 507–08. 
 23. See id. (―And finally, there is a fourth feature of real space that regulates behavior—
‗architecture.‘ By ‗architecture‘ I mean the physical world as we find it, even if ‗as we find it‘ is 
simply how it has already been made. That a highway divides two neighborhoods limits the 
extent to which the neighborhoods integrate. That a town has a square, easily accessible with a 
diversity of shops, increases the integration of residents in that town. That Paris has large 
boulevards limits the ability of revolutionaries to protest. That the Constitutional Court in 
Germany is in Karlsruhe, while the capital is in Berlin, limits the influence of one branch of 
government over the other. These constraints function in a way that shapes behavior. In this 
way, they too regulate.‖). 
 24. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 25. The information exchange is made possible by hardware and by electrons passing 
through cables, but my suggested focus for cyberlaw is on the informational qualities of the 
exchange rather than the hardware. A good discussion of confusion between hardware and 
content-based analyses of the Internet that plagued early discussions of Internet law can be 
found in Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 (2003). 
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facilitated by one or more Internet intermediaries such as ISPs, search 
engines, gaming platforms, and payment systems; and (c) most online 
interaction has at least the potential for global reach. 
No one can interact online without contracting with an ISP. The 
Internet experience is only meaningful in terms of interactions, all of 
which must be facilitated by intermediaries such as Facebook,
26
 
Flickr,
27
 MySpace,
28
 Shutterfly,
29
 Amazon,
30
 or Google.
31
 Internet 
intermediaries appear at many points within and are necessary to enable 
all online experiences. 
The fact that everything on the Internet may be described as an 
intermediated information exchange ultimately sets the parameters for 
cyberlaw, and sets cyberlaw apart as a distinct legal field. 
Understanding cyberlaw means understanding the nature and regulation 
of an information exchange involving more than just the originator and 
the recipient of a communication. One must further consider the impact 
of the global nature of the Internet on all of these issues. As most 
Internet disputes have the potential to raise jurisdictional concerns, there 
is a high risk within cyberlaw that the prominence of jurisdictional 
issues will detract from the development of substantive legal rules. The 
remainder of the discussion now turns to these issues. 
II.  INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 
Reconceptualizing cyberlaw as a law of intermediated information 
exchange clarifies the legal issues raised by online interactions. By 
shifting focus to Internet intermediaries, scholars and regulators can 
better understand cyberlaw as an integrated field. 
A.  Defining Internet Intermediaries 
For the purposes of this discussion, Internet intermediaries include 
any service provider that enables online interaction through either paid 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Facebook is a popular online social networking service. See FACEBOOK, http://www.fac 
ebook.com (last visited June 11, 2012). 
 27. Flickr is an online photo-sharing service. See FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com (last 
visited June 11, 2012). 
 28. MySpace is a social networking service and forum for sharing popular culture. See 
MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com (last visited June 11, 2012). 
 29. Shutterfly is an electronic business engaging in printing photographs and associated 
merchandise for customers as well as providing platforms for sharing photographs. See 
SHUTTERFLY, http://www.shutterfly.com (last visited June 11, 2012). 
 30. Amazon is an iconic early experiment in electronic commerce that started as a book 
and music retailer online and has grown to expand into various kinds of online marketplaces. 
See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited June 11, 2012). 
 31. Google is probably the world‘s leading search engine. See GOOGLE, http://www.google 
.com (last visited June 11, 2012). 
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subscription or general availability to the public.
32
 These intermediaries 
maintain distinct business models. They may make their money through 
subscription fees, through collecting user information and marketing it 
to other parties, through advertising, or through a combination of these 
approaches. However, the common feature is that they enable and 
facilitate online communications in many spheres—commercial, 
personal, social, artistic, academic, etc. 
Without intermediaries, no one could go online or do much of 
anything by way of online activity. Intermediaries thus play a powerful 
and important role. Where one intermediary holds a dominant position 
in a relevant niche—such as Google for online search or Facebook for 
social networking—the power of that intermediary may warrant 
significant scrutiny.
33
 
Identifying the role of Internet intermediaries in terms of their legal 
responsibilities is in many ways the foundational challenge of cyberlaw. 
The legal challenges that are unique to cyberspace law and that 
differentiate cyberlaw from other fields arise from the ways in which, 
and the extent to which, legislatures and courts are prepared to impose 
liability on intermediaries for online conduct initiated by others.
34
 The 
focal position of intermediaries within cyberlaw is further emphasized 
by the power these intermediaries can wield over the user experience 
through their ability to control the software code that enables online 
interaction and their ability to monitor online conduct.  
Intermediaries can control the user experience by regulating initial 
user access through passwords and other encryption technologies. 
Additionally, they can control and monitor all aspects of the user 
experience on their platforms by manipulating the underlying software 
code.
35
 For example, an avatar in Second Life
36
 can only be—and do—
what the software will support. Initially, Second Life did not provide 
skin colors for avatars outside the Caucasian range. The game now 
                                                                                                                     
 32. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for 
Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919, 931–32 (2010) [hereinafter Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”] 
(distinguishing between closed networks that require individual membership and open networks 
that are generally accessible to the public). 
 33. See, e.g., JANET LOWE, GOOGLE SPEAKS: SECRETS OF THE WORLD‘S GREATEST 
BILLIONAIRE ENTREPRENEURS, SERGEY BRIN AND LARRY PAGE, 10 (2009) (noting that as Google 
gained market share and power, it also gained negative publicity for becoming too powerful). 
Facebook has attracted much criticism for its lack of privacy protections for users. See, e.g., 
Rory Cellan-Jones, Facebook Faces Criticism on Privacy Change, BBC NEWS, Dec. 10, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8405334.stm. 
 34. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 35. See sources cited supra note 177. 
 36. Second Life is a virtual world where users can socialize with other users through 
online alter egos called avatars. See SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com (last visited June 11, 
2012). 
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supports the creation of additional tones—or ―skins‖37—for participants 
who want their avatars to appear as African-American, Native 
American, or Asian-American. Presumably, though, if Linden 
Laboratories, the creators of Second Life, objected to the creation of 
different skin colors, they could disable features of the software that 
allow users to create such skins. Intermediaries are the most effective 
―choke points‖ for enforcing desired norms of behavior online through 
their own policies, through the enforcement of legal rules, or through a 
combination of both.
38
 Judicial orders directed at intermediaries are 
much more likely to result in effective relief to plaintiffs than orders 
against often globally dispersed, impecunious private actors with 
limited, to no, control over the flow of harmful information once it has 
been uploaded to a website.
39
 An order requiring a major online 
intermediary—such as Facebook or YouTube—to remove defamatory 
or copyright infringing content, for example, is much more likely to be 
effective in practice than an attempt to seek out any number of private 
individuals in various jurisdictions who may be responsible for posting 
the infringing content in the first place.
40
 
B.  Direct Versus Indirect Liability for Internet Intermediaries 
The power and prominence of intermediaries underscore the 
importance of regulating these entities as a focal point for cyberlaw. By 
the same token, it is important that intermediaries, particularly those 
providing novel services, are not overregulated to the point that online 
innovation is chilled. Lawmakers are routinely faced with difficult 
questions involving the regulation of powerful, and often highly 
innovative, intermediaries. These questions include determining when 
an intermediary should be held liable for harmful online conduct 
instigated by another. Increasingly, Congress has drafted laws aimed 
specifically at the role of online intermediaries in an attempt to create 
clearer ex ante guidelines to balance technological innovation against 
the need to protect existing legal rights such as copyright, trademarks, 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See Skins & Shapes, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/destinations/fashion/skins 
(last visited May 13, 2012) (demonstrating ways to customize skin and body shapes in Second 
Life). 
 38. See Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi,” supra note 322, at 936–41 (evaluating rules of 
conduct promulgated by online service providers and limitations to their effective enforcement). 
 39. Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 
1139 (2011) [hereinafter Lipton, Cyber-Victimization] (―Laws per se suffer from difficulties of 
identifying an anonymous or pseudonymous defendant and having effective jurisdictional reach 
over the defendant. . . . Even if plaintiffs can identify their defendants—which may require an 
expensive and time-consuming court order—they are often judgment-proof.‖). 
 40. A court order against an intermediary will not be a perfect solution given the tendency 
for information to jump from website to website online, but it will be more effective than an 
order against one or more private individuals. 
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personal reputations, etc. Obvious examples include the ISP safe harbor 
provisions in the Copyright Act
41
 and the Communications Decency 
Act, respectively,
42
 as well as the contentious provisions in SOPA.
43
 
The problem with many current cyberlaw texts is that questions of 
intermediary liability are scattered throughout chapters focusing on 
specific kinds of tortious liability—copyright, trademark, defamation, 
etc. This organization tends to discourage a focus on the central 
question involving the rights and obligations of intermediaries across 
discrete subject matter areas. Questions about intermediary liability for 
copyright infringement are found in a textbook chapter on copyright 
law, while intermediary liability for defamation or privacy is typically 
discussed in a free speech, privacy, or general tort chapter. It would 
make much more sense for discussions of intermediary liability to be 
considered together across all relevant fields of law—copyright, 
trademark, defamation, privacy, bullying, harassment, etc. Taking this 
approach, important synergies inherent in the role of intermediaries 
could be drawn out, and more consistent and predictable legal rules 
could be developed. 
For example, one question that plagues cyberlaw is the increasing 
difficulty inherent in ascertaining when an intermediary should be held 
primarily, as opposed to secondarily, liable for an online wrong. When a 
wrong is committed in the physical world—such as theft, conversion, 
negligence, or battery—the identity of the primary wrongdoer is usually 
readily apparent, and it is usually not an intermediary. Even if a third 
party facilitates the wrong, the actual wrongdoer is generally easy 
enough to distinguish from that third party. If I steal from you and 
deposit the proceeds in my bank account, the bank may be secondarily 
liable for some aspects of my conduct
44
 and may be subject to a 
garnishment order in relation to the stolen funds.
45
 However, it is clear 
that the bank—the intermediary—is not the primary wrongdoer. I am. 
Online, however, it is often difficult to discern who is most 
appropriately identified as the primary wrongdoer. In Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.,
46
 for example, it 
was unclear to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                                     
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c) (2006); see also discussion infra Section II.C. 
 42. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006); see also discussion infra Section II.C. 
 43. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://thomas.loc. 
gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.3261:. 
 44. See, e.g., William Blair, Secondary Liability of Financial Institutions for the Fraud of 
Third Parties, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 74 (2000) (noting the basis upon which secondary liability is 
often imposed on banks and financial institutions in British-based common law systems). 
 45. See Allen C. Myers, Untangling the Safety Net: Protecting Federal Benefits from 
Freezes, Fees, and Garnishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 371, 375–80 (2009) (explaining the 
basis and nature of a typical garnishment order filed against a bank). 
 46. 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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whether the Netscape search engine should be regarded as a primary, or 
as a secondary infringer of Playboy‘s trademarks.47 Netscape‘s 
advertising system allowed its paying advertisers to link their 
advertisements to terms pre-identified by Netscape as common search 
terms in the advertiser‘s field. Thus, a dog food company might pay to 
have its advertisements keyed to search results when an Internet user 
enters a search query related to dogs.
48
 
Playboy complained that Netscape included Playboy‘s trademarked 
terms ―playboy‖ and ―playmate‖ for keying advertisements related to 
adult entertainment.
49
 Some of the resulting advertisements were not 
clearly labeled as to whether they were officially related to Playboy‘s 
business.
50
 An Internet user clicking on an ad might incorrectly assume 
he or she was dealing with Playboy rather than an unaffiliated entity 
providing similar services. A successful trademark infringement action 
requires consumers of a product or service to be confused about the 
source of that product or service.
51
 Playboy thus claimed infringement 
with respect to the ambiguously presented advertisements keyed to the 
terms ―playboy‖ and ―playmate.‖ 
While ultimately holding Netscape liable for infringement, the Ninth 
Circuit judges were unsure about whether Netscape was best described 
as a primary or a secondary infringer of Playboy‘s trademarks.52 In 
many ways, secondary liability for Internet intermediaries makes sense 
in most contexts. Intermediaries, by definition, are third parties who 
facilitate activities between principal actors.  
Online, however, the lines are blurred between primary and 
secondary actors, largely because intermediaries physically control the 
software code that enables primary actors to engage in wrongful online 
conduct. The Ninth Circuit in Playboy did not resolve the issue of 
primary versus secondary liability, holding that Netscape was liable for 
infringement on either basis so there was no need to determine which 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Id. at 1024. 
 48. Id. at 1022–23 (―Keying allows advertisers to target individuals with certain interests 
by linking advertisements to pre-identified terms. To take an innocuous example, a person who 
searches for a term related to gardening may be a likely customer for a company selling seeds. 
Thus, a seed company might pay to have its advertisement displayed when searchers enter terms 
related to gardening.‖). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1023 (―[Plaintiff] introduced evidence that the adult-oriented banner ads 
displayed on defendants‘ search results pages are often graphic in nature and are confusingly 
labeled or not labeled at all.‖). 
 51. Id. at 1024 (―The ‗core element of trademark infringement,‘ the likelihood of 
confusion, lies at the center of this case.‖). 
 52. Id. (―[T]he parties dispute whether a direct or a contributory theory of liability applies 
to defendants‘ actions. We conclude that defendants are potentially liable under one theory and 
that we need not decide which one.‖). 
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one.
53
  
One could convincingly argue either way. It is easy to suggest that 
the advertisers competing with the plaintiff were primarily liable for 
infringement because they were the ones who drafted the confusing ads 
that were keyed to the plaintiff‘s trademarks. Alternatively, one could 
argue that Netscape should be primarily liable because of its choice of 
the keywords it coded into the system and its broadcasting of the 
confusing advertisements in the search results.  
While the characterization of Netscape as a primary or secondary 
infringer had no practical impact on the decision in this case, in other 
cases the question of primary versus secondary liability for Internet 
intermediaries has taken on greater significance. For example, in 
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,
54
 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit was tasked with ascertaining whether 
the provider of an interactive digital video recorder (DVR) was 
primarily or secondarily liable for copyright infringement with respect 
to content copied to its servers at its customers‘ request.55 
Like Playboy, the facts of Cartoon Network are unique to 
cyberspace. They simply could not have arisen in the context of pre-
digital video recording technologies. In the good old days of Betamax 
and VHS tape recorders, it was clear that any primary infringements—
unauthorized copies of protected content—were made by owners of 
video recorders.
56
 The providers of the copying technology were not 
involved in the primary infringements because they did not decide 
which programs were recorded, when they were being recorded, or how 
often they were being recorded.
57
 The providers did not even know 
which programs were being recorded by their customers.  
These pre-digital intermediaries merely provided the technology that 
enabled copying. The United States Supreme Court in 1984 stated as 
much in the seminal case of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., holding that Sony, as the manufacturer of the Betamax 
video tape recorder, might be held secondarily liable for infringements 
of copyrighted works carried out by its customers if the customers were 
primary infringers.
58
 The court found no primary infringement on the 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Id. (―Whether the defendants are directly or merely contributorily liable proves to be a 
tricky question. However, we need not decide that question here. We conclude that defendants 
are either directly or contributorily liable. Under either theory, [plaintiff‘s] case may proceed. 
Thus, we need not decide this issue.‖). 
 54. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 55. Id. at 130. 
 56. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446–47 (1984) 
(characterizing Sony as having no direct involvement with those who copy programs without 
authorization). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 446. 
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customers‘ part by virtue of the application of the fair use defense.59 
However, in Cartoon Network, the Second Circuit faced a new 
problem of consumer copying in the digital context, with technology 
now enabling copying to occur remotely over a network. The DVR 
service in Cartoon Network mimicked the functionality of the analog 
video recorder under consideration in Sony, but technically, it operated 
quite differently. As with a set-top video recorder, the DVR service 
provided by the defendant, Cablevision, allowed its customers to record 
programs from the television. However, unlike analog recorders, 
Cablevision‘s service enabled copies to be made remotely and stored on 
Cablevision‘s servers.60 Thus, Cablevision itself physically made the 
infringing copies of protected television programs at its customers‘ 
request and stored them on its own servers.
61
 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Cablevision was not a 
direct copyright infringer.
62
 According to the court, if there was any 
infringement, it was by the users of the service, who effectively made 
the copies by ordering Cablevision‘s servers to record them.63 These 
users, though, are unlikely to be held liable as direct infringers because 
of the Sony decision. In Sony, the Supreme Court held that television 
audiences did not infringe copyrights when they recorded programs for 
later viewing.
64
 This practice was labeled ―time shifting‖ and was 
considered by a majority of the Supreme Court to be a fair use of the 
copyrighted work.
65
 Assuming that Cablevision‘s customers were 
largely engaged in time shifting, the Second Circuit was correct in 
suggesting that there was no primary infringement for which 
Cablevision could be secondarily liable.
66
  
 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 454–55 (holding that the copying by owners of DVRs was authorized time 
shifting and thus covered by the fair use defense to copyright infringement). 
 60. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124–25 (describing the operation of Cablevision‘s 
remote DVR system). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 133 (―We conclude only that on the facts of this case, copies produced by the 
RS-DVR system are ‗made‘ by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision‘s contribution to this 
reproduction by providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct liability.‖). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456 (―One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that 
the elected representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have made 
it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition 
against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.‖). 
 65. Id. at 454–55 (―[W]e must conclude that this record amply supports the District 
Court‘s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.‖). 
 66. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (―The question is who made this copy. If it is 
Cablevision, plaintiffs‘ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs‘ 
theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary liability, a theory of 
liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.‖). 
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While this result seems logical, the Second Circuit had to go to some 
lengths in its reasoning to avoid finding Cablevision liable as a direct 
infringer. Unlike Sony with its old Betamax video recorders, it was 
Cablevision that made the actual copies of protected works, at its 
customers‘ instigation. Moreover, unauthorized reproduction of 
protected works attracts strict liability under the Copyright Act.
67
 
The Second Circuit avoided the direct infringement result largely by 
reading a volition requirement into the Copyright Act that does not 
literally appear in the statute.
68
 Following an earlier Internet 
intermediary copyright case, the Second Circuit again chipped away at 
the strict liability basis of copyright infringement in order to reach the 
desired result, a result that was consistent with the spirit of the earlier 
Sony case, if not the technical reality.
69
 
Questions of primary versus secondary liability for intermediaries 
come up again and again in different online contexts
70
 and are often 
resolved inconsistently, partly due to the failure of judges and scholars 
to focus on synergies between the role of intermediaries across different 
fields of law. The cyberlaw of the future should focus on the role of the 
                                                                                                                     
 67. JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 13 (2011) 
(―copyright law is a strict liability regime with no mens rea requirement for liability‖). 
 68. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131 (―When there is a dispute as to the author of an 
allegedly infringing instance of reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the 
volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made. There are only two instances of volitional 
conduct in this case: Cablevision‘s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that 
exists only to produce a copy, and a customer‘s conduct in ordering that system to produce a 
copy of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems clear—and we know of no case 
holding otherwise—that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to 
make the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who 
manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe 
that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as 
a direct infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that 
customer‘s command.‖); see also Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and 
Innocent Copyright Infringement, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 767, 791 (2011) (―The Cartoon 
Network court employed an approach adopted in at least one earlier Internet case involving 
individual copying that had been enabled by an Internet service provider. The earlier case had 
imposed a ‗volition‘ requirement in the context of direct infringement. In other words, the 
plaintiff needed to prove that the defendant‘s conduct was volitional rather than a largely 
automated technological process. This volition requirement may be seen as a judicial gloss on 
strict liability to accommodate technological innovation.‖). 
 69. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Commc‘ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). 
 70. See, e.g., Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (discussing primary versus secondary 
liability of video recording service provider in the copyright infringement context); Fair Hous. 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 
2008) (discussing whether an online housemate matching service could be held primarily liable 
for content posted by customers that allegedly infringed fair housing legislation); Playboy 
Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc‘ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing 
primary versus secondary liability of search engine in the trademark infringement context). 
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Internet intermediary to enable discussions about primary versus 
secondary liability to be examined consistently within a cohesive 
theoretical framework across discrete areas of law. It may be that a 
general presumption of secondary, rather than primary, liability makes 
sense for intermediaries because of their nature as ―middlemen‖ for 
facilitating the conduct of others. However, even within the context of 
secondary liability for intermediaries, significant challenges arise. 
C.  Questions of Secondary Liability 
In the early days of the Internet, legal questions about intermediary 
liability tended to revolve around ISPs that provided bulletin boards and 
other basic communication forums.
71
 Litigants asked courts whether 
providers of such forums could be held liable for content posted by their 
members and, if so, on what basis.
72
 The most common claims in the 
late 1990s related to defamation and copyright.
73
 
In the absence of a unified cyberlaw field focusing on ISP liability 
issues in the 1990s, courts and legislators took a narrow approach to 
questions of ISP liability, considering each situation largely within the 
context of the distinct legal wrong involved. Thus, lawmakers may have 
missed critical points in the development of Internet law that they could 
have used to ensure a systematic consideration of principles of Internet 
intermediary liability. The law on ISP liability for defamation and 
copyright evolved, first through common law and later through 
legislation, in a piecemeal fashion. Today it is difficult to reconcile the 
principles of ISP liability for defamation with those of ISP liability for 
copyright infringement.  
In early defamation cases, for example, courts generally exempted 
ISPs from liability for defamatory comments posted by others provided 
that the ISP had not itself exercised significant editorial control over the 
content.
74
 This soon proved problematic because it effectively penalized 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See, e.g., Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365 (considering extent to which ISP and operator 
of bulletin board service could be held liable for copyright infringements of those posting 
information on the bulletin board); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 
(M.D. Fla. 1993) (considering liability of bulletin board operator for copyright infringements of 
those posting on the bulletin board); Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 138 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering liability of ISP for allegedly defamatory content posted by its 
customers); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. May 24, 1995) (considering liability of ISP for allegedly defamatory comments posted by 
customers). 
 72. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 138 (considering liability of ISP for allegedly defamatory 
content posted by its customers); Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (considering 
liability of ISP for allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers). 
 73. See cases cited supra note 71. 
 74. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 141 (holding ISP was not liable for defamatory content 
posted by others); Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (holding ISP liable for 
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ISPs that were attempting to ―do the right thing‖ and censor 
inappropriate conduct. The more active the ISP was in, say, protecting 
children from harmful material, the more likely it was to attract legal 
liability.
75
 ISPs that turned a blind eye to the content of communications 
were more likely to escape legal liability than those that were proactive 
about monitoring content.
76
 
Congress eventually intervened, enacting Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA). This section, in relevant part, 
provides that: ―No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.‖77 Courts interpreted this 
provision as almost blanket immunity for ISPs with respect to 
defamatory comments posted by others.
78
 In one case, an ISP was 
exempted from liability even though it had contracted with a columnist 
to contribute provocative content that it knew was likely to be 
defamatory.
79
 In another case, an ISP was held to be immune where it 
had been made aware of damaging false comments and had failed to 
remove them in a timely fashion.
80
 To date, ISPs have only been held 
liable as information content providers under Section 230 where they 
have actually written the relevant content themselves.
81
 
The current position on ISP liability for defamation differs 
dramatically from the current position on ISP liability for copyright 
infringement. Initially, when Internet users posted copyrighted content 
on bulletin boards, courts struggled to determine whether the ISPs that 
provided the forums should be held liable for those infringements.
82
 
                                                                                                                     
comments posted by others because it exercised significant control over content through its 
family-friendly monitoring practices). 
 75. See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4–5 (holding family-friendly ISP 
liable for allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers because of its attempts to 
monitor content, suggesting it should have controlled content more effectively). 
 76. Id. at *5 (―PRODIGY‘s conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, has 
opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that make no 
such choice.‖). 
 77. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
 78. David Lukmire, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The 
Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 372 (2010) 
(―Over the years, state and federal courts have interpreted section 230 expansively, conferring a 
broad immunity upon website operators that host third-party content. The statute has grown into 
a ‗judicial oak,‘ with impacts far beyond its language sounding in defamation law and its 
original intent to prevent the nascent Internet from becoming a ‗red light district.‘‖). 
 79. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51–53 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 80. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 81. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). It is important to note, however, that this was not a defamation case, 
but rather a case involving alleged violations of fair housing legislation. 
 82. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘ns Servs., Inc. 907 F. 
Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering copyright infringement liability of ISP and 
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/5
2012] LAW OF THE INTERMEDIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE 1353 
 
Ultimately, Congress stepped in to ensure that ISPs were not held liable 
for copyright infringement when they were acting as mere conduits or 
repositories for the postings of others.
83
  
Congress enacted the Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act (OCILLA) as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) package of 1998. OCILLA provides a safe harbor for ISPs 
in cases of non-volitional or non-willful copying: In other words, 
copying that occurs as part of a purely technical or mechanical process 
that was initiated by another person.
84
 The statute also exempts ISPs 
from liability where the ISP had no actual or constructive knowledge of 
the infringement, had not directly benefited from the infringement, and 
had responded expeditiously to a request to remove infringing content.
85
 
The ISP safe harbors for defamation and copyright were enacted 
around the same time.
86
 However, the respective statutes clearly follow 
different approaches. This result is not surprising given that the drafters 
of OCILLA were focused on amending the Copyright Act for the digital 
age, while the drafters of the CDA were dealing with a broader statute 
designed to protect children from harmful material online.
87
 Both 
statutes were incredibly challenging to draft,
88
 particularly in the early 
days of the Internet when it was unclear how relevant technologies 
would develop, how people would use them, and indeed what role 
Internet intermediaries would ultimately play in monitoring online 
communications.  
Nonetheless, the statutes shared significant commonalities in aim, at 
least in the case of the ISP safe harbor provisions. Drafters of both 
statutes were faced with the emerging role of the Internet intermediary 
and with questions about the impact of imposing liability on intermediaries 
for wrongs committed by others. However, each drafting group 
understandably focused on its own brief without examining the nature 
of ISP liability more generally. 
 
                                                                                                                     
bulletin board operator); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 
1993) (considering ISP liability for copyright infringement). 
 83. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. § 512(c). The statute also exempts ISPs from liability for system caching—
temporary housing of copies of digital information. Id. § 512(b). 
 86. Section 230 of the CDA was enacted in 1996 while OCILLA was enacted in 1998. 
 87. Lukmire, supra note 78, at 373–75 (describing the legislative history of the 
Communications Decency Act as an attempt to constitutionally incentivize website operators to 
police the Internet and to prevent minors from accessing harmful content). 
 88. In fact, significant portions of the CDA (other than section 230) failed to pass 
constitutional muster in the face of First Amendment challenges. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 
U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (striking down other sections of the legislation for creating impermissibly 
overbroad constraints on online communication). 
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In the final analysis, it is possible to reconcile the approaches taken 
by Congress respectively in OCILLA and in Section 230 of the CDA, 
although the reconciliation may be somewhat unsatisfying as an ex post 
facto rationalization. For example, one might argue that it is easier for 
an ISP to have knowledge of a copyright infringement than of the 
veracity of a defamation claim, because copyrights are generally 
registered,
89
 and because OCILLA requires the claimant to give detailed 
notice to the ISP of a copyright claim.
90
 Thus, it is arguably reasonable 
to hold ISPs liable for copyright infringement on the basis of notice but 
to exempt them from defamation liability regardless of notice. It is at 
least theoretically much easier for an ISP to make a reasonable 
judgment about the veracity of a copyright claim than about the 
legitimacy of a defamation claim. 
Of course, one could argue that if an ISP is not in a good position to 
make decisions about the merits of a defamation claim, then the ISP 
should err on the side of protecting the claimant‘s reputation and should 
be exposed to liability if it fails to act. However, this opens 
intermediaries up to potentially frivolous claims that cannot be easily 
verified. If an intermediary is required to act on each claim by removing 
offending material—or at least investigating the merits—the resulting 
costs to those service providers may be prohibitive. There is no easy 
way for an ISP to determine whether posted comments are defamatory 
or not, as opposed to a copyright claim where registration of a copyright 
is at least prima facie evidence of its validity.
91
  
In all contexts, Internet intermediaries are routinely put in the 
unenviable position of either erring on the side of facilitating the free 
flow of ideas online or of monitoring and policing content. Where the 
content involves potentially infringing on rights, the existence of which 
can be relatively easily verified by the intermediary, it might be 
reasonable to impose liability on the intermediary if it fails to act. In 
other circumstances, liability might be less appropriate absent a 
showing of complicity by the intermediary in the wrongful conduct. 
One might criticize the different approaches taken between OCILLA 
and Section 230 of the CDA. In fact, it is interesting that there is so little 
commentary on the comparison between the two approaches in current 
literature. In both defamation and copyright claims, ISPs have been put 
into the position of making difficult decisions about whether or not to 
act in the face of a complaint. In both cases they have had to examine 
                                                                                                                     
 89. TEHRANIAN, supra note 67, at 98 (noting the necessity of registering copyrighted 
works in the United States in order to obtain meaningful judicial relief for infringement). 
 90. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2006) (outlining several elements a claimant must 
include in its notification to an ISP). 
 91. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 273 (5th ed. 2010) (noting 
that registration of a copyright ―confers prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright‖). 
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the extent to which they might be regarded as complicit in the alleged 
wrong. And in both cases they have been put in the position of making 
decisions that impact free expression: that is, to remove content and risk 
being criticized for censorship or to allow allegedly infringing content 
and risk being sued as complicit in the commission of an online wrong. 
However, Congress acted in a way that misses these synergies, taking 
one approach with respect to copyrights and another with respect to 
defamation and other harmful content.  
D.  Benefits of a Renewed Focus on Intermediary Liability 
Refocusing the cyberlaw field as a law of the intermediated 
information exchange would create an effective theoretical framework 
within which to investigate the commonalities between facially 
disparate areas of law like intermediary liability for defamation and for 
copyright infringement. There is a pressing need to develop such a 
theoretical framework. New issues of intermediary liability are 
constantly arising, often requiring novel applications of existing legal 
principles.
92
  
The lack of a coherent theoretical framework governing the liability 
of Internet intermediaries for online wrongs is exemplified in debates 
over SOPA.
93
 The bill grants the attorney general the power to bring 
actions against owners of websites that host content that infringes on 
American intellectual property rights.
94
 It also imposes significant 
obligations on online service providers to comply with court orders 
made in accordance with the legislation.
95
 These obligations include 
increased policing and monitoring of content transmitted via their 
services.
96
 The new legal duties, if implemented, would place new 
burdens on service providers including search engines,
97
 online payment 
systems,
98
 and online advertising services.
99
 
While this legislation is aimed at the protection of intellectual 
property rights in particular, it covers in general the same issues that 
arise in relation to the enforcement of other laws in cyberspace. It deals 
                                                                                                                     
 92. See LOWE, supra note 33, at 213 (―From patent, copyright, and trademark 
infringement to click fraud to wrongful dismissal, Google spends a lot of time in court. While it 
is true that Google makes a large target, it also is true . . . that it is operating in a field littered 
with uncertainties begging to be resolved in the courts of law. Some of the lawsuits address key 
issues that could define both Google and the Internet of the future.‖). 
 93. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 1. 
 94. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(b) (2011), available at http://th 
omas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.3261:. 
 95. See id. § 102(c)(2). 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. § 102(c)(2)(B). 
 98. Id. § 102(c)(2)(C). 
 99. Id. § 102(c)(2)(D). 
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with finding an appropriate framework for imposing legal obligations 
on online service providers with respect to wrongs committed by others. 
The drafters of this bill, like the drafters of the legislation described in 
Section II.C., are faced with the competing aims of encouraging online 
innovation and preventing online harm. Additionally, as with the CDA 
and OCILLA, the drafters of SOPA have latched onto the reality that 
online service providers can be the most effective choke points in online 
interaction to interrupt the flow of infringing or harmful 
communications. 
Lobbyists for free speech and privacy rights argue that SOPA strikes 
the balance too heavily in favor of protecting proprietary content and 
will negatively impact the online marketplace of information and 
ideas.
100
 Those representing the digital content industries take the 
position that legislation aimed at blocking the online flow of infringing 
content is necessary to protect innovation in digital content production 
and distribution.
101
 As with the CDA and OCILLA, under SOPA, the 
online intermediaries effectively become the meat in the sandwich 
between those who advocate for free speech and privacy rights and 
those who seek to prevent intellectual property infringement. A more 
comprehensive and cohesive theoretical framework within which to 
consider the appropriate role for online service providers in these 
contexts would be extremely helpful in furthering more balanced 
drafting of legislation such as SOPA. 
Of course, SOPA has been drafted in its current form in the context 
of existing case law dealing with the role of online intermediaries for 
the intellectual property infringements of others. This case law may not 
have given Congress particularly effective guidance in drafting 
legislation aimed at balancing online information flow against the need 
to prevent widespread copyright infringement. Two relatively recent 
decisions handed down by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit prior to the drafting of SOPA went in two different 
directions on the potential copyright infringement liability of an Internet 
search engine and a group of electronic payment system providers, 
respectively. 
The respective defendants were the Google search engine in one 
case
102
 and the Visa online payment system in the other.
103
 The plaintiff 
in each case was Perfect 10, a company that sold photos of nude models 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 1 (―Information is the currency of democracy, and 
people will not sit still as moneyed interests try to deny them access.‖). 
 101. See id. (describing the aims of the legislation from the point of view of copyright 
holders). 
 102. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 103. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int‘l Serv., Ass‘n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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online.
104
 In the litigation against Google, Perfect 10 claimed copyright 
infringement with respect to unauthorized reproductions and displays of 
its copyrighted photographs that showed up in Google‘s search 
results.
105
 Perfect 10 claimed both direct and indirect infringement, 
arguing that Google should be held responsible for its own 
reproductions and displays of the copyrighted photographs in its search 
engine results.
106
 It argued that Google should also be held secondarily 
liable for the infringements by the people who had actually made the 
illegal copies in the first place—the copies that had shown up in search 
results.
107
 In the litigation against Visa, Perfect 10 claimed only 
secondary liability with respect to Visa‘s enabling payments to 
companies that sold unauthorized reproductions of Perfect 10‘s 
protected photographs.
108
 
With respect to the secondary liability claims, the Ninth Circuit 
ultimately held that Google could potentially be contributorily liable for 
the copyright infringements, but that there were factual matters to 
reconsider on remand.
109
 With respect to Visa, however, the court held 
that there was no secondary liability because Visa‘s activities were too 
far removed from the primary infringements to be regarded as 
                                                                                                                     
 104. See Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1157 (―Perfect 10 markets and sells copyrighted images of 
nude models. Among other enterprises, it operates a subscription website on the Internet. 
Subscribers pay a monthly fee to view Perfect 10 images in a ‗members‘ area‘ of the site.‖). 
 105. Id. at 1159 (―Perfect 10 claims that Google‘s search engine program directly infringes 
two exclusive rights granted to copyright holders: its display rights and its distribution rights.‖). 
 106. Id. at 1163 (noting that plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case that 
Google had infringed its copyrights by reproducing copyrighted photographs as thumbnail 
images). But see id. at 1168 (holding that Google‘s reproductions of the images as thumbnails in 
its search engine results page was a fair use and therefore non-infringing). 
 107. Id. at 1170 (describing the need to evaluate ―Perfect 10‘s arguments that Google is 
secondarily liable in light of the direct infringement that is undisputed by the parties: third-party 
websites‘ reproducing, displaying, and distributing unauthorized copies of Perfect 10‘s images 
on the Internet‖). 
 108. Visa, 494 F.3d at 792 (―[Perfect 10] sued Visa International Service Association, 
MasterCard International Inc., and several affiliated banks and data processing services 
(collectively, the Defendants), alleging secondary liability under federal copyright . . . law . . . . 
It sued because Defendants continue to process credit card payments to websites that infringe 
Perfect 10‘s intellectual property rights after being notified by Perfect 10 of infringement by 
those websites.‖). 
 109. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1172–73 (―Google could be held contributorily liable if it had 
knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search engine, could take 
simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10‘s copyrighted works, and failed to take 
such steps. The district court did not resolve the factual disputes over the adequacy of Perfect 
10‘s notices to Google and Google‘s responses to these notices. Moreover, there are factual 
disputes over whether there are reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from 
providing access to infringing images. Therefore, we must remand this claim to the district court 
for further consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in establishing that Google 
was contributorily liable . . . .‖). 
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contributing to those infringements.
110
 In distinguishing the Google 
case, the court noted in Visa that ―[t]he salient distinction is that 
Google‘s search engine itself assists in the distribution of infringing 
content to Internet users, while [Visa‘s] payment systems do not.‖111 
The majority in Visa admitted that Visa assists in making the primary 
infringements profitable, but they distinguished the profitability of the 
infringement from the distribution and availability of infringing images 
online.
112
 
Visa included a strong dissent from Judge Alex Kozinski, who 
argued that the payment system not only provides an economic 
incentive to infringe, but actually provides ―an essential step in the 
infringement process.‖113 In Judge Kozinski‘s view, without the 
payment systems, infringement would be almost impossible.
114
 Clearly, 
there is room for disagreement about where to draw the secondary 
liability line when it comes to Internet gatekeepers. An appropriately 
reconceptualized cyberlaw field would provide a much needed 
theoretical framework within which to reconsider these issues.  
While providing accessible and innovative services to enable 
individuals to interact more efficiently and effectively, online service 
providers are subject to the possibility of secondary liability claims for 
activities about which they have little actual knowledge, including 
copyright, defamation, trademark infringement, bullying, harassment 
liability, etc. Courts are likely to be faced with questions about what an 
intermediary could or should have known about the activities of a 
primary infringer in a number of these different contexts. These 
                                                                                                                     
 110. Visa, 494 F.3d at 796 (―The credit card companies cannot be said to materially 
contribute to the infringement in this case because they have no direct connection to that 
infringement. Here, the infringement rests on the reproduction, alteration, display and 
distribution of Perfect 10‘s images over the Internet. Perfect 10 has not alleged that any 
infringing material passes over Defendants‘ payment networks or through their payment 
processing systems, or that Defendants‘ systems are used to alter or display the infringing 
images. . . . While Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants make it easier for websites to profit 
from this infringing activity, the issue here is reproduction, alteration, display and distribution, 
which can occur without payment.‖). 
 111. Id. at 797. 
 112. Id. (―[Visa] do[es], as alleged, make infringement more profitable, and people are 
generally more inclined to engage in an activity when it is financially profitable. However, there 
is an additional step in the causal chain: Google may materially contribute to infringement by 
making it fast and easy for third parties to locate and distribute infringing material, whereas 
[Visa] make[s] it easier for infringement to be profitable, which tends to increase financial 
incentives to infringe, which in turn tends to increase infringement.‖). 
 113. Id. at 812 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. (―My colleagues recognize, as they must, that helping consumers locate infringing 
content can constitute contributory infringement, but they consign the means of payment to 
secondary status. . . . But why is locating infringing images more central to infringement than 
paying for them? If infringing images can‘t be found, there can be no infringement; but if 
infringing images can‘t be paid for, there can be no infringement either.‖). 
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questions are not unique to copyright law.  
As intermediaries‘ business operations continue to scale up, they 
may be less and less sure of what their users are doing. In remanding the 
Google case back to the lower court, the Ninth Circuit was mindful that 
it had insufficient information about the realities of Google‘s position to 
make a meaningful determination on contributory liability for copyright 
infringement. It only held that liability was possible on this basis, but it 
wanted the lower court to look more closely at the actual position of 
Google, and whether Google realistically had the capabilities to detect 
and prevent copyright infringement.
115
 
Courts and legislatures will continue to face questions of secondary 
liability of online intermediaries in copyright infringement cases and in 
other areas of law as well. However, to date, these issues have been 
tackled on a subject matter basis. SOPA and OCILLA are both confined 
to the position of Internet intermediaries with respect to copyright 
infringements. Section 230 of the CDA, though, considers similar issues 
with respect to other online conduct such as defamation and other forms 
of harmful speech outside the intellectual property arena.
116
 
Current cyberlaw scholars tend to consider each specific question 
within a vacuum without looking at the role of Internet intermediaries 
more broadly. As cyberlaw is, in reality, the law of intermediated 
information exchange, a debate that is refocused more specifically on 
the role of online intermediaries has a better chance of achieving 
consistency of application than the current piecemeal approach. 
E.  Responsibilities to Unmask Online Wrongdoers 
Another advantage of refocusing cyberlaw on the role of Internet 
intermediaries would be that such a move would provide a theoretical 
paradigm within which to consider the unique role of intermediaries in 
terms of their potential to unmask online wrongdoers. Internet 
intermediaries are often the only entity within a dispute capable of 
identifying or locating an online wrongdoer, even in circumstances 
where the intermediary itself is not complicit in committing the harm. 
Much online communication is anonymous or pseudonymous.
117
 Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(―[T]here are factual disputes over whether there are reasonable and feasible means for Google 
to refrain from providing access to infringing images. Therefore, we must remand this claim to 
the district court for further consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in 
establishing that Google was contributorily liable for in-line linking to full-size infringing 
images under the test enunciated today.‖). 
 116. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006) (―Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.‖). 
 117. Lipton, Cyber-Victimization, supra note 399, at 1114 (―The anonymity provided by 
the Internet may increase the volume of abusive conduct because it may encourage individuals 
who would not engage in such conduct offline to do so in the anonymous virtual forum provided 
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victims of online wrongs frequently cannot identify those engaging in 
harmful conduct. 
However, again, the law must strike a delicate balance between 
ensuring that intermediaries assist in unmasking wrongdoers and 
avoiding a chilling effect on intermediaries‘ business models. If 
intermediaries are too often and too easily required to identify 
customers who wish to remain anonymous, this will likely result in a 
chilling of online activity. This has been one of the most marked 
criticisms of SOPA, involving the extent to which the legislation would 
require online service providers to take responsibility for policing online 
wrongdoers and potentially infringing the privacy and autonomy of their 
customers in the process.
118
 
There is a delicate balance to be struck between the obligations of 
Internet intermediaries to law enforcement and to their customer 
bases.
119
 Internet users may be loath to communicate online for fear of 
being unmasked if there is an excessive obligation on intermediaries to 
police their activities.
120
 Intermediaries may also falter in the 
marketplace if they cannot protect their customers‘ privacy 
sufficiently.
121
 Additionally, the requirement that intermediaries stand 
ready to unmask their customers imposes costs on intermediaries related 
to obtaining and maintaining sufficiently detailed records to identify 
customers when necessary.  
To date, courts have developed rules to determine the circumstances 
under which an Internet intermediary may be ordered to divulge the 
identity of an alleged defendant
122
 or a witness to an online wrong.
123
 In 
                                                                                                                     
by the Internet . . . .‖). 
 118. See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(c) (2011), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.3261:. 
 119. Moreover, as online service providers such as Facebook increasingly become public 
corporations, they will be faced with additional obligations to shareholders. 
 120. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to 
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641 (1995) (noting the trend for 
Internet users to desire to speak without censorship and to take advantage of the Internet‘s 
relative anonymity in doing so). 
 121. See id. at 1671 (―The Networld has an abundance of opportunities for full and 
uninhibited speech. The difficulty has become one of offended parties seeking to inhibit the 
speech of the offending posters of messages. As the offended turn to their lawyers to redress 
their grievances, this uninhibited cauldron of opinion becomes threatened. Should strict liability 
for all electronic transmission become the accepted norm, service providers might scramble to 
hide behind contracts, waivers, monitoring of all content, and censorship of messages before 
posting. . . . Liability insurance would be prohibitively expensive, the burden of monitoring all 
messages before posting them too demanding, and the possibility of facing protracted litigation 
too onerous.‖). 
 122. See, e.g., Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254–55 (D. Conn. 2008); 
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 2000 WL 1210372, at *5–7 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
2000). 
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these cases, judges have had to draw lines that most appropriately 
balance the interests of an intermediary in protecting its members‘ 
anonymity against the interests of a complainant. Judges have faced 
these challenges in the context of cases involving copyright 
infringement,
124
 defamation,
125
 trademark infringement,
126
 and 
complaints about reputational harm.
127
 
A broader look at these questions through the lens of Internet 
intermediary liability more generally would enable more cohesive and 
systematic rules to develop over time. The development of clearer rules 
about the responsibility of intermediaries to maintain and to divulge 
identifying records about customers would assist in making business 
more predictable for intermediaries and for their customers. This 
predictability may also be useful to victims of online wrongs as they 
would gain a better ex ante sense of the likelihood of unmasking a 
potential defendant or witness in a given situation. 
The role of the Internet intermediary is effectively the foundation of 
cyberlaw, or at least it should be. Intermediaries are necessary for all 
online interaction. No one can communicate online without using at 
least one intermediary. As gatekeepers to all we do online, 
intermediaries hold great power in the sense of enabling access to online 
communications, setting the parameters of online conduct through their 
software coding, and maintaining records of the identities of online 
actors. They can also be the most effective choke points to prevent 
harmful online interactions. 
However, imposing legal responsibilities on intermediaries always 
comes at a cost. The more duties legally imposed on intermediaries, the 
more likely the result will be a chilling of online innovation. 
Reconceptualizing cyberlaw as a field, the primary focus of which is to 
address these issues, would lead to significant benefits in terms of 
creating greater certainty for online service providers and their 
customers with respect to their legal rights and obligations. 
III.  JURISDICTION  
Of course, any reconceptualization of the cyberlaw field should 
retain some focus on the major jurisdictional challenges created by 
cyberspace interactions. Again, Internet intermediaries will often be key 
players in jurisdictional disputes, as they are the parties that enable the 
global communications and are often the easiest parties for a defendant 
to locate. Additionally, a court order against an intermediary will likely 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.Com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wa. 2001). 
 124. See, e.g., In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 246 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 125. See, e.g., Am. Online, 52 Va. Cir. at *1. 
 126. See, e.g., Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 575. 
 127. See, e.g., Doe I, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 251. 
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be more effective than an order against often multiple individual 
defendants, because the intermediaries are the choke points for 
communications. If an intermediary is ordered to remove or monitor the 
flow of certain information, the result will be more effective than an 
order against a private defendant who may use aliases or pseudonyms, 
who may effectively mask his location, and who may likely be 
judgment-proof.
128
 When global communications were easily, quickly, 
and cheaply enabled in the 1990s by the widespread public take-up of 
the Internet, it seemed obvious that the major new legal issues would be 
jurisdictional.  
The Internet opened up seemingly endless possibilities for litigating 
against foreign defendants, raising choice of law and choice of forum 
questions, as well as foreign enforcement challenges.
129
 Even if a court 
in the plaintiff‘s jurisdiction agreed to exercise jurisdiction over a 
foreign defendant and an order was obtained in favor of the plaintiff, it 
would not always be clear that the order could be enforced in the 
foreign jurisdiction. Particularly problematic have been cases where the 
defendant held no assets in the plaintiff‘s jurisdiction that could be 
attached as part of a judgment order. The ongoing litigation between 
Yahoo! and La Ligue contre le Racisme et l‘Antisemitisme in France is 
a good example highlighting uncertainties about how, or indeed if, a 
court order from the plaintiff‘s country might be enforced in the 
defendant‘s country.130  
In Yahoo!, a French plaintiff successfully obtained a French court 
order to have Yahoo! enjoined from facilitating sales of Nazi 
memorabilia in France.
131
 Subsequently, Yahoo! took up the matter in 
California and attempted to obtain a declaration from the federal district 
court that the French order could not be enforced against Yahoo!‘s 
assets in California.
132
 To date, the courts have refrained from giving a 
definitive answer to this question.
133
 The Ninth Circuit has been split on 
whether the case is ripe for a decision, and as to whether the district 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 129. See generally Michael Gilden, Jurisdiction and the Internet: The “Real World” Meets 
Cyberspace, 7 ILSA J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 149, 150 (2000) (examining the ―best methods for 
confronting the issue of global jurisdiction in cyberspace‖). 
 130. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L‘Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
 131. Id. at 1202. 
 132. Id. at 1204. 
 133. Id. at 1224 (―An eight-judge majority of the en banc panel holds . . . that the district 
court properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over defendants LICRA and UEJF . . . . A 
three-judge plurality of the panel concludes . . . that the suit is unripe for decision . . . . When the 
votes of the three judges who conclude that the suit is unripe are combined with the votes of the 
three dissenting judges who conclude that there is no personal jurisdiction over LICRA and 
UEJF, there are six votes to dismiss Yahoo!‘s suit.‖). 
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court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the French organization.
134
 
The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari,
135
 so ultimately 
any decision made will be in the federal district court. 
Jurisdictional questions are, of course, not new to cyberspace. 
However, the Internet raises new challenges for conflicts of law by its 
very nature. When addressing jurisdictional issues in cyberspace, courts 
have often complicated their analyses by focusing on the physical 
hardware aspects of the Internet. For example, at a loss for guidance on 
how to ascertain whether a defendant purposefully availed herself of the 
plaintiff‘s forum,136 early cyberspace cases tended to focus on the 
location of physical computer servers.
137
 This approach led to random 
and unpredictable results because of the nature of the Internet‘s 
hardware.
138
 The whole point of the network is that electrons flow 
relatively randomly through cables—and now wirelessly—to avoid a 
single point of failure bringing down the entire network.
139
 Thus, 
premising jurisdictional queries on electron flows is unlikely to lead to 
principled or predictable legal rules. 
One reason for the tendency to focus on the physical aspects of the 
network is derived from difficulties inherent in the other obvious 
option—to consider where the defendant actually engaged in the 
harmful conduct. When the defendant‘s conduct is an online 
communication and that communication is accessible globally, the 
purposeful availment inquiry is not very meaningful. If a defendant 
posts, for example, a defamatory comment about a plaintiff on a blog 
that is accessible globally, is it fair to say that the defendant has 
purposely availed herself of the jurisdiction of the entire world?
140
 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Id. 
 135. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l‘Antisemitisme v. Yahoo! Inc., 547 U.S. 1163 (2006). 
 136. Purposeful availment, a prong of a specific personal jurisdiction inquiry, focuses on 
the defendant‘s activities within the plaintiff‘s forum. See, for example, discussion of the 
concept in Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205–06. 
 137. See, e.g., Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 1999) 
(hinging personal jurisdiction on fortuitous location of servers accessed by defendants). 
 138. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First 
Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, 94 n.38 (2000) (―The TCP/IP protocols break down 
information transmitted on to the Internet into packets and reassemble it at its destination. This 
allows the Internet to operate as a packet-switched network where the various data packets may 
travel different routes to reach the same destination. This design allows information to be 
transmitted through the Internet at faster speeds than circuit-switched networks, where, once a 
connection is made, that part of the network is dedicated only to that connection.‖) (citations 
omitted); see also Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in 
Entertainment, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1082 (2009). 
 139. Ku, supra note 138. 
 140. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, ¶ 54 (Austl.) (noting 
defamation defendant‘s concern about being haled into court in any jurisdiction in which its 
online publications were accessed). 
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Another alternative is to create a blanket rule that the appropriate 
jurisdiction for litigation is the place where the plaintiff suffers harm. 
Several courts have taken this approach,
141
 and it certainly seems 
logical, at least from the plaintiff‘s point of view. One could easily 
argue that plaintiffs in, say, defamation suits should not have to go to 
foreign courts to sue defendants who may be taking advantage of their 
geographical distance or of more lenient defamation laws in a particular 
jurisdiction. 
However, erring on the side of the plaintiff‘s jurisdiction may not be 
particularly fair to the online defendant. If a defendant is potentially 
liable for any comments made online under the laws of any jurisdiction 
in which a plaintiff resides or does business, it may be impossible for 
that defendant to protect itself from unexpected foreign litigation. The 
reality is that many defendants today do not even know where a plaintiff 
is located or where that plaintiff might suffer harm. 
Under a rule that favored the plaintiff‘s jurisdiction, exposure to 
significant risks of litigation in foreign jurisdictions may ultimately chill 
much online speech. Defamation defendants have argued against such a 
rule in past litigation.
142
 These concerns come into sharp relief in 
situations where defendants are amateur journalists and social 
commentators, rather than large scale media conglomerates, as is 
increasingly the case online.
143
 Small individual defendants are less 
likely than a large media outlet to possess the wherewithal to defend 
proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction.  
While there are a number of counterarguments to concerns about 
unfairness to defendants,
144
 the point of this discussion is not to identify 
the correct rule on personal jurisdiction in cyberspace. Rather, it is to 
                                                                                                                     
 141. See, e.g., id. at 606–07 (―[O]rdinarily, defamation is to be located at the place where 
the damage to reputation occurs. Ordinarily that will be where the material which is alleged to 
be defamatory is available in comprehensible form assuming, of course, that the person defamed 
has in that place a reputation which is thereby damaged.‖); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 
(1984) (granting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant with respect to a defamation action 
that harmed the plaintiff, actress Shirley Jones, in California). 
 142. See, e.g., Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., [2001] V.S.C. 305, ¶ 56 (Austl.) (noting 
American publisher‘s significant concerns at being haled into court in Australia for an article it 
published allegedly defaming an Australian resident). 
 143. See ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR: HOW TODAY‘S INTERNET IS KILLING 
OUR CULTURE 4 (2007). 
 144. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, ¶ 54 (Austl.) (arguing that 
damages award will only be made in a defamation case where the plaintiff realistically has a 
reputation to harm in the place where publication is received); id. ¶ 53 (noting that plaintiffs are 
unlikely to sue in a jurisdiction outside the defendant‘s forum unless a judgment in that forum 
would be of real value to the plaintiff and the answer to that question may depend on whether, 
and to what extent, the defendant holds assets in the plaintiff‘s forum); id. ¶ 54 (―[I]n all except 
the most unusual of cases, identifying the person about whom material is to be published will 
readily identify the defamation law to which that person may resort.‖). 
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demonstrate that cyberspace raises unique challenges in terms of 
jurisdiction. It is necessary within the cyberlaw field to investigate 
factors that differentiate cyberspace from physical space in the context 
of these jurisdictional challenges. Unlike physical-world publications, 
information disseminated over the Internet can generally be received 
anywhere in the world, subject only to technological limitations such as 
firewalls and encryption. Thus the default position in Internet 
publication is effectively opposite to that in the physical world. Online 
information defaults to being published to everyone globally, whereas 
in the physical world information is only published to those to whom 
the publisher has specifically directed it. Thus, the risk of being haled 
into court in an unexpected foreign jurisdiction is significantly higher 
for a defendant in an Internet case than in a traditional, physical world 
case. SOPA itself recognizes the problem inherent in global online 
communications through its attempt to impose monitoring obligations 
on domestic ISPs to limit infringing activities conducted or facilitated 
by foreign actors.
145
 
The Internet may raise additional challenges related to jurisdiction. 
In Internet-based litigation, there is a high risk that the initial focus of 
the litigation will be on jurisdictional issues, rather than on the 
substance of the plaintiff‘s complaint. Because of the disproportionately 
high number of jurisdictional issues in cyberspace cases in comparison 
with physical-world cases, a greater number of cyberspace cases might 
be disposed of at the jurisdictional stage without ever getting to a 
determination of the parties‘ substantive rights. The cyberlaw field can 
provide a forum within which jurisdictional rules may be streamlined 
and harmonized. Such a result would minimize the time and expense 
spent on initial jurisdictional questions and would allow judges to focus 
more on exploring and developing the substantive rights and obligations 
of parties in cyberspace disputes. 
A recent example of a case in which jurisdictional considerations 
arguably detracted from an investigation of the plaintiff‘s substantive 
rights is Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA.
146
 In this case, Chang brought 
inter alia a privacy claim against Virgin Mobile for unauthorized use of 
a photograph of Chang in an advertising campaign.
147
 Chang resided in 
Texas while the advertising campaign took place in Australia.
148
 Virgin 
                                                                                                                     
 145. See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(a) (2011), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.3261:. 
 146. No. 3:07-CV-1767-D, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3051 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009). 
 147. Id. at *1–2 (―Plaintiffs Susan Chang . . . as next friend of Alison Chang . . . a 
minor . . . sued defendant Virgin Mobile Pty Ltd. . . . an Australian-based company, in Texas 
state court on claims for invasion of privacy, libel, breach of contract, and copyright 
infringement based on Virgin Australia‘s use of an image of Alison . . . in its ‗Are You With Us 
or What‘ advertising campaign . . . .‖). 
 148. Id. 
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Mobile had found the picture of Chang online and copied it from a 
public photo-sharing website.
149
 Virgin Mobile had only utilized the 
photograph within Australia on bus shelter ad shells.
150
 It had never 
used the advertisement in the United States, nor had it posted the ad to 
the Internet.
151
 Because the defendant had never directed any of its 
conduct towards the state of Texas, the American court held that it 
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
152
 
This decision effectively left Chang without a substantive remedy. 
For one thing, she was an individual and a teenager without the 
wherewithal to sue the defendants in Australia. Perhaps more 
significantly, Australia does not have the same privacy torts available to 
plaintiffs as the United States. In the United States, Chang could have 
claimed misappropriation of her personal image under the 
misappropriation limb of privacy tort law.
153
 The misappropriation tort 
provides a remedy to a plaintiff where a defendant has made an 
unauthorized commercial use of her name or likeness.
154
 There is no 
similar tort in Australia, even if Chang had the wherewithal to litigate 
there. Thus, the resolution of the dispute for lack of jurisdiction 
foreclosed the possibility of a substantive discussion of the legal nature 
of privacy rights and expectations in the global online arena. 
There may in fact be nothing wrong with the ultimate holding in 
Chang. If Texas is not the correct forum for litigation, then Chang is out 
of luck. Too readily allowing plaintiffs to sue in their home jurisdictions 
in Internet cases, as noted above, may impose insurmountable burdens 
on defendants and hence on online speech more generally.  
However, Chang is far from the only Internet case that has been 
effectively resolved by a jurisdictional inquiry either because the 
plaintiff could not afford to sue in the defendant‘s jurisdiction or 
because the plaintiff did not have a colorable claim under the 
defendant‘s law. Many Internet cases have historically been effectively 
resolved at the jurisdiction determination stage, or have used the 
jurisdictional inquiry as a testing ground for considering the merits of 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at *4 (―The advertisement was placed on bus shelter ad shells in major 
metropolitan areas in Australia. Virgin Australia never distributed the advertisement 
incorporating Alison‘s image in the United States, including Texas, and it never posted the 
photograph on its website or on any other website.‖). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at *26 (―Because none of the . . . contacts on which plaintiffs rely establishes 
sufficient minimum contacts between Virgin Australia and the state of Texas, the court cannot 
constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Virgin Australia.‖). 
 153. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977) (―One who appropriates to his own 
use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of 
his privacy.‖). 
 154. See id. 
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the case.
155
 The proportion of Internet cases raising jurisdictional issues 
is likely to be higher than the proportion of non-Internet cases. Thus, 
Internet law creates greater risks of jurisdictional inquiries detracting 
from the opportunity to debate and develop substantive legal rules.   
A reconceptualized cyberlaw field could contribute a more 
systematic ex ante approach to the development and application of 
jurisdictional principles in Internet-related cases. The ability to more 
quickly, efficiently, and predictably resolve jurisdictional problems 
would allow greater focus on developing more meaningful substantive 
rules for online conduct. Of course, jurisdictional issues both online and 
offline are often extremely difficult to resolve. Nevertheless, the ability 
to focus specifically on cyberspace-related jurisdictional problems 
within a more unified theoretical framework is likely to assist in more 
principled and predictable legal developments. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than being dismissed as a cyber ―law of the horse,‖ cyberlaw 
is much more effectively characterized as a law of the intermediated 
information exchange with global dimensions. There is a pressing need 
to recognize a body of legal theory within which to debate the role of 
Internet intermediaries within the global information economy. Across a 
variety of fields—intellectual property, defamation, privacy, fraud, 
etc.—Internet intermediaries face common problems. Yet there is 
currently no obvious theoretical space within which to debate these 
issues. 
Cyberlaw scholars are overly focused on subject classifications of 
disputes. They fail to draw together common threads relating to Internet 
intermediaries in relation to issues such as balancing the need to 
encourage online innovation against the need to prevent online wrongs. 
Thus, the pastiche of legislation and case law that has developed over 
the past fifteen years or so has been inconsistent; it has depended on the 
specific subject matter at hand in a particular context.  
The cyberlaw of the future should revolve around detailed analysis 
of the legal responsibilities of Internet intermediaries in many contexts. 
It should also incorporate jurisdictional considerations to ensure that the 
development of substantive legal principles is not hindered by 
overemphasis on procedural questions that could be more readily 
answered through development of clearer ex ante rules.   
Refocusing the cyberlaw field on the global nature of the conflicts 
and the central role of online intermediaries will bring forth a more 
                                                                                                                     
 155. For example, in Cable News Network v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484 (E.D. Va. 
2001), the court avoided substantive issues related to cybersquatting by effectively resolving the 
dispute on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 492. 
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cohesive and predictable set of rules to govern online conduct. Once the 
legal rules are more clearly delineated in terms of ascertaining the 
substantive legal rights and obligations of intermediaries, the law can 
turn to other important issues of cyberspace regulation, such as: (a) 
ensuring conformity of laws with emerging online norms; (b) ensuring 
appropriate remedies for online harms; and (c) creating appropriate 
liability rules for closed versus open service networks.
156
 Until a 
theoretical framework emerges within which to debate these issues, 
however, we are stuck with piecemeal and fragmented consideration of 
the legal role of online intermediaries within disparate subjects such as 
intellectual property, defamation, privacy, and fraud. It is time to 
reconceptualize the cyberlaw field with respect to what is truly unique 
about it: the fact that it governs global communications intermediated 
by one or more third parties. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 156. See Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi,” supra note 32, at 931–32 (discussing the distinction 
between closed and open online networks). 
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